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Enforcement of Corporate and Securities Laws
in India
The Arrival of the Class Action?

vikramaditya khanna

1 Introduction
Corporate governance in Asia has garnered a great deal of recent scholarly attention.1 One topic that permeates discussions across countries is
the enforcement of corporate and securities laws – with some countries
1

The literature is vast, for a sampling, see e.g. Stijn Claessens and Joseph P.H. Fan, ‘Corporate
Governance in Asia: A Survey’, 3 International Review of Finance 71–103 (2002); Donald
C. Clarke, ‘Corporate Governance in China: An Overview’, 14 China Economic Review
494–507 (2003); Hideki Kanda, Kon-Sik Kim and Curtis J. Milhaupt, Transforming
Corporate Governance in East Asia, (Routledge, 2008); Vikramaditya Khanna, ‘Corporate
Governance Ratings: One Score, Two Scores, or More?’, 158 University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 39–51 (2009); Vikramaditya Khanna, ‘Corporate Governance in India: Past, Present
& Future?’, 1 Jindal Global Law Review 171–196 (2009); Vikramaditya Khanna and
Umakanth Varottil, ‘The Rarity of Derivative Actions in India: Reasons and
Consequences’ in Derivative Actions in Major Asian Economies: Legislative Design and
Legal Practice, Harald Baum, Michael Ewing-Chow and Dan W. Puchniak (eds.),
(Cambridge University Press, 2012); Vikramaditya Khanna and Umakanth Varottil,
‘Board Independence in India: From Form to Function?’ forthcoming in Independent
Directors in Asia: A Historical, Contextual and Comparative Approach, Harald Baum,
Souichirou Kozuka, Luke Nottage, and Dan W. Puchniak (eds.) (2016); Curtis J. Milhaupt
and Benjamin L. Liebman, Regulating the Visible Hand? The Institutional Implications of
Chinese State Capitalism, (Oxford University Press, 2015); Curtis J. Milhaupt and
Wentong Zheng, ‘Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm’, 103
Georgetown Law Journal 665–722 (2015); Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), White Paper on Corporate Governance in Asia (2003); OECD,
Corporate Governance in Asia – Progress and Challenges (2011); OECD, Public
Enforcement and Corporate Governance in Asia – Guidance and Good Practices (2014);
Daniel W. Puckniak, Harald Baum and Michael Ewing-Chow, The Derivative Action in Asia:
A Comparative and Functional Approach, (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
Umakanth Varottil, ‘A Cautionary Tale of the Transplant Eﬀect on Indian Corporate
Governance’, 21 National Law School of India Review 1–49 (2009).
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relying primarily on public enforcement (i.e. enforcement by government) while others rely on some combination of public and private
enforcement (i.e. enforcement by private shareholders). Further, understanding how enforcement is operationalised and its concomitant
strengths and weaknesses enables us to better appreciate the actual
corporate governance situation in many countries.2 In light of this, the
enforcement of corporate and securities laws in India is examined in this
chapter with special attention paid to the recent reforms that allow for
class actions, for the ﬁrst time, under Section 245 of the Companies Act
2013 of India.
To explore this issue in greater depth, this chapter examines the likely
value of private enforcement against the background of India’s ownership structure and institutional context. This involves laying out what the
pre-existing methods of enforcement are and how, if at all, the class
action provision builds on their ediﬁce. It also involves a general assessment of how successful this incarnation of the class action is likely to be
in the Indian corporate governance space. The overall conclusion is that
class actions are likely to be of limited value because of: (1) the glacial
speed of the Indian courts, (2) the lack of contingency fees, (3) the limited
availability of monetary remedies under the class action provision, and
(4) the interaction between ownership structure in India – virtually all
2

This literature is also voluminous, for a sampling see, e.g. John C. Coﬀee, Jr., ‘Law and the
Market: The Impact of Enforcement’, 156 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 229–311
(2007); Robert Daines and Charles Jones, ‘Mandatory Disclosure, Information Asymmetry
and Liquidity: The Eﬀect of the 1934 Act’, Draft (2012); Dhammika Dharmapala and
Vikramaditya Khanna, ‘Corporate Governance, Enforcement, and Firm Value: Evidence
from India’, 29 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1056–1084 (2013); Howell
E. Jackson and Mark J. Roe, ‘Public Enforcement of Securities Laws: Preliminary
Evidence’, 93 Journal of Financial Economics 207–238 (2009); Vikramaditya Khanna,
‘Law Enforcement & Stock Market Development: Evidence from India’, No. 97, Center
for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Freeman Spogli Institute for
International Studies, Stanford University (2009). Available at: http://cddrl.fsi.stanford
.edu/publications/law_enforcement_and_stock_market_development_evidence_from_in
dia; Vikramaditya Khanna, and Umakanth Varottil, ‘The Rarity of Derivative Actions in
India: Reasons and Consequences’ in Derivative Actions in Major Asian Economies:
Legislative Design and Legal Practice, Harald Baum, Michael Ewing-Chow and Dan
W. Puchniak (eds.), (Cambridge University Press, 2012); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopezde-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer. ‘What Works in Securities Laws?’, 61 Journal of Finance
1–32 (2006); Curtis J. Milhaupt and Katharina Pistor, Law and Capitalism: What
Corporate Crises Reveal About Legal Systems and Economic Development Around the
World, (University of Chicago Press, 2008); Mark J. Roe and Jordan I. Siegel, ‘Political
Instability: Its Eﬀects on Financial Development, its Roots in the Severity of Economic
Inequality’, 39 Journal of Comparative Economics 279–309 (2011).
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ﬁrms are controlled – and the absence of ﬁduciary duties owed by
controllers to minority shareholders. The last point suggests that the
class action in India is a procedural device that is only weakly tethered
to an underlying duty.
This, however, does not mean that signiﬁcant reform of enforcement
should not be pursued in India. Indeed, quite the opposite – this chapter
suggests some reforms that are likely to be more useful than the current
class action regime in light of the institutional context and ownership
structure in India. In particular, reliance on early warning signals provided by regulators and perhaps a version of arbitration that has been
tried with measured success in other jurisdictions are worthy of greater
consideration.
Section 2 begins by describing the enforcement terrain prior to the
enactment of the Companies Act 2013. Public enforcement in India was,
until fairly recently, plagued with lengthy delays in obtaining a remedy due
to the well-known delays in the Indian judicial system. Indeed, public
enforcement only began to move at a relatively faster speed in the last few
years as the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) – the securities
market regulator – started to take a more active role in examining the
governance concerns animating the Indian business context (e.g.
controller–minority conﬂicts). On the private enforcement side, derivative
suits were not common (and took a long time to deliver any result),
statutory oppression and mismanagement actions were also heavily
delayed (perhaps around ﬁfteen years), there was no easy way to aggregate
shareholders claims (or to pay attorneys contingency fees)3 and the
remaining causes of action (e.g. contract or tort) had diﬃcult-to-satisfy
requirements and lengthy delays as well. Moreover, when SEBI became
more active in enforcement, it operated to reduce the scope of private
enforcement because of how courts interpreted certain statutory provisions on their jurisdiction once SEBI was involved. Overall, the state of
both public and private enforcement in corporate governance in India
prior to 2013 was quite ineﬀectual. This sets the stage for considering
whether it might be valuable to enhance private enforcement in the Indian
context and what measures might be considered (such as class actions).
3

There are other ways to potentially aggregate claims (some discussed in this section) that
could conceivably be useful in corporate cases. India allows ‘public interest litigation’ as
well, but that is unlikely to be used in the corporate context. On PIL, see generally
Surya Deva, ‘Public Interest Litigation in India: A Critical Review’, 28 Civil Justice
Quarterly 19–40 (2009); S.P. Sathe, Judicial Activism in India (Oxford University Press,
2002).
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Section 3 lays out the arguments usually put forward for why private
enforcement may add value to a system relying primarily on public
enforcement.4 Two of the key reasons are that private enforcement may
incentivise private individuals (i.e. shareholders) to come forward with
their corporate governance related information because they stand to
gain from it. Moreover, private enforcement – because it holds out the
prospect of recovering money for investors – may also aid in deepening
liquidity in a market. Both of these features may be particularly important in emerging markets, which frequently suﬀer from poor public
enforcement and thinly traded markets.
Section 4 then examines some of the key features of the Indian
context that are relevant for our inquiry. In particular, it discusses the
ownership structure in India where virtually all ﬁrms are controlled –
whether by a family business house, the state, a foreign multinational,
or the founders of the ﬁrm (who do not belong to the same family or
kinship group). This means the key agency problem is not the separation of ownership and control per se, but rather the conﬂict between the
controller and the minority shareholders which should then in turn
animate much of the discussion in the Indian context. Second, the other
key feature of the Indian landscape relates to the legal system – very
long delays in addressing commercial and civil matters and the absence
of a contingency fee system (often thought to be valuable in the class
action context). This suggests that reliance on timely judicial resolution
of corporate governance disputes in India may not be realistic in the
current environment.
Section 5 examines reforms that might enhance private enforcement.
Section 5.1 starts with the class action provision (Section 245 of the
Companies Act 2013) and examines how its structure, the absence of
contingency fees, and the absence of ﬁduciary duties owed by a controller
to minorities undermines the value of such an action. Investors may then
need to rely on other methods to assuage their governance concerns such
as reputation, large holdings, cross holdings, and so forth. Section 5.2
explores some alternatives to class actions that might prove to be useful
supplements. Given the institutional conditions and ownership structure
4

See William Landes and Richard A. Posner, ‘The Private Enforcement of Law’, 4 Journal of
Legal Studies 1–46 (1975); Stephen J. Choi and Adam C. Pritchard, Securities Regulation:
Cases and Materials, 4th ed., (Foundation Press, 2015); Vikramaditya Khanna, ‘Law
Enforcement & Stock Market Development: Evidence from India’; and George Akerlof,
‘The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’, 84 Quarterly
Journal of Economics 488–500 (1970).
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in India, it would appear that reliance on non-judicial methods of dispute
resolution is going to be important (e.g. arbitration). Moreover, with
a respected and more active regulator in the mix (i.e. SEBI) perhaps
greater reliance on it as an enforcer or facilitator of enforcement (e.g.
through early warning signals) might be very useful.
Section 6 concludes with comments on how even though the changes
suggested here may be useful, one should also inquire more deeply into
how investors are currently protecting their interests in Indian ﬁrms.
This is important because when devising enforcement structures and
systems, it will be useful to acquaint oneself with the existing structures to
examine how they may also prove useful for enhancing investor protection and corporate governance in India.

2 Pre-2013 Enforcement
It is generally well understood that law and enforcement are important
for the growth of stock markets. This is because investors are more likely
to invest, all else equal, in ﬁrms based in jurisdictions that provide
investors with some sense of protection so that they are more secure in
investing in entities where they have limited control.5 Investor protection
laws (e.g. corporate and securities laws) and their enforcement are ways
in which some measure of security may be obtained (as are other sorts of
private ordering mechanisms (reputation, reliable intermediaries)).6
Prior research has indicated that enforcement of the law is important
in a number of spheres ranging from signalling government attitudes to
governance issues,7 providing assurances to investors on the credibility of
anti-expropriation measures and ﬁrm disclosures,8 and letting investors
know that their concerns can be addressed in some manner.9
5

6

7
8

9

Daines and Jones, ‘Mandatory Disclosure, Information Asymmetry and Liquidity’;
Jackson and Roe, ‘Public Enforcement of Securities Laws’; Khanna, ‘Law Enforcement &
Stock Market Development’; La Porta et al., ‘What Works in Securities Laws?’.
John C. Coﬀee, Jr., ‘The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in
the Separation of Ownership and Control’, 111 Yale Law Journal 1–82 (2001).
Milhaupt and Pistor, Law and Capitalism.
La Porta et al., ‘What Works in Securities Laws?’; Daines and Jones, ‘Mandatory
Disclosure, Information Asymmetry and Liquidity’.
Coﬀee, ‘Law and the Market’; Jackson and Roe, ‘Public Enforcement of Securities Laws’;
Khanna, ‘Law Enforcement & Stock Market Development’; Roe and Siegel, ‘Political
Instability’. For a broader discussion of how these factors interact in the development of
active stock markets in India, see Khanna, ‘Law Enforcement & Stock Market
Development’. For a discussion of important conceptual issues related to corporate law,
see Reinier H. Kraakman, Paul Davies, Henry Hansmann, Gerhard Hertig, Klaus Hopt,
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In light of this, examining the various kinds of enforcement options
available in India becomes critical. This part engages in that inquiry by
dividing the discussion into two parts – Section 2.1 addresses public
enforcement in India and Section 2.2 discusses private enforcement in
India before 2013.

2.1 Public Enforcement of Corporate and Securities Laws in India
Enforcement of corporate and securities laws by the government occurs
in multiple ways in India. The two primary methods are enforcement by
the securities market regulator – the Securities and Exchange Board of
India (SEBI) – and enforcement via the Ministry of Company Aﬀairs and
the Registrar of Companies. This is supplemented by occasional reliance
on the criminal law.10

2.1.1 Securities and Exchange Board of India
SEBI has a broad mandate – to protect ‘the interest of investors or orderly
development of securities markets’11 – but for the purposes of this
chapter our discussion is limited to its power to impose penalties, grant
other remedies (e.g. delisting), and initiate criminal prosecution for
violations related to corporate governance requirements under the
Securities and Contracts (Regulation) Act 1956 (SCRA), the Securities
and Exchange Board of India Act 1992 (SEBI Act), and any rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder. SEBI’s jurisdiction includes listed
ﬁrms and their directors, oﬃcers, or controlling shareholders, and it has
developed a reputation over the years for moving matters rather expeditiously to resolution.12

10

11
12

Hideki Kanda, and Edward Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and
Functional Approach, 2nd ed., (Oxford University Press, 2009).
One might treat stock exchange enforcement as a form of quasi-public or quasi-private
enforcement (see Paul G. Mahoney, ‘The Exchange as Regulator’, 83 Virginia Law Review
1453–1500 (1997) and Adam C. Pritchard, ‘Self-Regulation and Securities Markets’, 26
Regulation 32–39 (2003)), but in India stock exchange listing requirements are often
enforced by SEBI.
Securities and Exchange Board of India Act 1992, Section 11B.
G. Sabarinathan, ‘Securities and Exchange Board of India and the Regulation of Indian
Securities Market’, Working Paper No 2010-06-309, Unpublished working paper, Indian
Institute of Management, Bangalore (2010); Ajit Dayanandan, Sarat Malik and Sneha
Nautiyal, ‘Eﬀectiveness of SEBI’s Complaints Redress Systems (SCORES) in India’
(2015), available at: www.sebi.gov.in/cms/sebi_data/DRG_Study/DRG_II_Scores_150920.
Praise for SEBI has not been uniform, especially recently – see Dev Chatterjee,
‘GIFT to create regulatory crisis for RBI, SEBI: Mistry’, Business Standard, 23 February
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The primary corporate governance provision is Clause 49, promulgated by SEBI in 2000, which bears substantial similarities to the OECD’s
best practices from around that time.13 Clause 49 is a mandatory part of
the Stock Exchange Listing Agreement, and violations of it can result in
SEBI imposing large ﬁnancial and criminal penalties on ﬁrms and directors under Section 23E of the SCRA (1956).14
In spite of this, active enforcement in this area has taken some time to
get started. Although it was fairly well known that many ﬁrms were not in
compliance with Clause 49’s requirements,15 SEBI only started investigating violations in September 2007 (SEBI Press Release, 2007) – seven
years after Clause 49 came into operation – and to date no sanctions have
been imposed.16
There are, of course, other regulations that are of import, such as the
prohibition of insider trading (and unfair trading), the ‘takeover’ regulations (relevant in share acquisition cases), and regulation on the failure of
ﬁrms to address grievances by investors17 where SEBI enforcement has
been more active. However, the issues addressed in these regulations are
not at the core of governance concerns in India.18 Nonetheless, proof that
SEBI can be an active enforcer in some areas holds out hope that it could
also be an important player in the governance context. Indeed, the increasing breadth of SEBI’s powers and its willingness to use certain remedies
makes approaching SEBI a popular course of action for investors.19

13
14

15

16

17

18
19

2016, www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/gift-to-create-regulatory-crisisfor-rbi-sebi-mistry-116022200637_1.html.
Khanna, ‘Corporate Governance in India’.
SEBI decisions may be appealed through various layers of the Indian administrative and
judicial apparatus and all the way to the apex court – the Supreme Court of India.
N. Balasubramaniam, Bernard S. Black, and Vikramaditya Khanna, ‘The Relation
Between Firm-Level Corporate Governance and Market Value: A Study of India’, 11
Emerging Markets Review 319–340 (2010).
A number of these actions were against government owned ﬁrms, and to date, only
three of these proceedings have been resolved (leading to no sanctions) (SEBI Press
Release. 2007. ‘SEBI initiates adjudication proceedings against 20 companies for noncompliance of Clause 49 norms’. SEBI PR No.257/2007 (11 September, 2007).
Available at: www.sebi.gov.in/Index.jsp?contentDisp=Section&sec_id=1).
See Section 23C of the SCRA (1956), Sections 12A, 15C and 15G of the SEBI Act (1992),
Sections 3 and 4 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent
and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulations 2003 and Securities
and Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers)
Regulations, as amended in 2010 (‘Takeover Code’) Sections 45(5) and 45(6).
SEBI Annual Report. 2008–09, www.sebi.gov.in/annualreport/0809/annualrep08-09.pdf.
G. Sabarinathan, ‘Securities and Exchange Board of India and the Regulation of
Indian Securities Market; Ajit Dayanandan, Sarat Malik, and Sneha Nautiyal,
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Having said this, it is noteworthy that private enforcement is usually
precluded where SEBI is empowered to act or issue orders because the
operation of sections 15Y and 20A of the SEBI Act prohibits civil courts
from taking jurisdiction and entertaining a suit in such situations.20
Thus, the enhancement in public enforcement comes at the cost of
limiting private enforcement in this context.

2.1.2 Ministry of Company Aﬀairs
Along with SEBI enforcing India’s securities laws, the Ministry of
Company Aﬀairs (MCA) administers India’s Companies Laws.21 The
MCA primarily investigates matters through its investigations divisions,
regional directors, registrars of companies, and more recently the serious
fraud oﬃce, and promulgates rules under certain statutes (e.g. the corporate social responsibility rules under the new Companies Act 2013).
Although the MCA has broad investigatory authority, the cases it could
bring are limited to only certain provisions (which are discussed shortly)
and have been subject to signiﬁcant delays leading to MCA’s having
a substantially weakened ability to play an important and timely enforcement role.
2.1.3 Reserve Bank of India
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has the power to regulate a number
of things under the Foreign Exchange Management Act 2000 (FEMA
2000) that can have an impact on governance (e.g. acquisitions using
foreign currency).22 Although these might be important in speciﬁc
cases, they are not generally considered core governance concerns
and thus I refrain from discussing the RBI’s enforcement role in any
greater detail.

20

21

22

‘Eﬀectiveness of SEBI’s Complaints Redress Systems (SCORES) in India’;
Pankaj Vaish, ‘Sebi: A Watchful and Eﬃcient Regulator’, LiveMint, 22 February 2016.
Available at: www.livemint.com/Opinion/isaido0Fv2QYHTBkOCAj3M/Sebi-A-watchfuland-eﬃcient-regulator.html; Anirudh Laskar and Vyas Mohan, ‘Sebi’s 25-Year Journey’,
LiveMint, 21 May 2013. Available at: www.livemint.com/Industry/xer1j7wBRbQH1
UTOBVrRaL/Sebis-25year-journey.html.
Both the courts – in Kesha Applicances P. Ltd v. Royal Holdings Services Ltd (2006) 130
Comp. Cas. 227 (Bom.), para. 43 – and the Reserve Bank of India (see Report of
Committee on Financial Sector (2009) at para. 4.3.4)) – have held that the civil jurisdiction of the courts is excluded in such instances.
Ministry of Company Aﬀairs Annual Report (2005), www.mca.gov.in/MinistryWebsite/
dca/report/annualreport2005.html.
For details, see www.rbi.org.in/scripts/Fema.aspx.

2 p r e - 2 0 13 e n f o r c e m en t

341

2.1.4 Criminal Liability
Governance concerns can rise to the level of criminal liability in India.
In particular, the Indian Penal Code (IPC) makes it a crime to engage in
a criminal breach of trust (Section 406) or cheating (Section 420).23 These
provisions have been used at times to police governance issues,24 but they are
generally not used with high frequency. Moreover, conviction rates are fairly
low in India,25 which is likely to weaken the deterrent eﬀect of such laws.26
Based on this brief overview, the impression one gets is that, except for
SEBI in the last few years, public enforcement in the area of corporate and
securities laws in India has been quite lacklustre. That then leads to the
discussion on private enforcement.
2.2 Private Enforcement
Although there are multiple bases for private civil enforcement in the
corporate governance space in India (e.g. derivative suits, oppression and
mismanagement, fraud and so forth) they all largely suﬀer from lengthy
delays in the judicial process and unclear bases for liability. This creates
a weak form of private enforcement. This section begins its discussion
with derivative suits and then proceeds to examine the other forms of
private civil enforcement.

2.2.1 Derivative Suits
Although derivative suits are available in India, they are quite rare for
a number of reasons.27 First and foremost is that India’s derivative suit
23

24

25

26

27

See Tristar Consultants v. VcustomerServices, AIR2007 Delhi 157; Nanalal Zaver
v. Bombay Life Assurance, AIR 1950 SC 172.
Vikramaditya Khanna and Shaun J. Mathew, ‘The Role of Independent Directors in
Controlled Firms in India: Preliminary Interview Evidence’, 22 National Law School of
India Review 35–66 (2010).
Bibek Debroy and Aditya Singh, ‘Justice Delivery in India: A Snap Shot of Problems and
Reforms’, in C. I. Herman (ed.), Economic Developments in India (Academic Foundation,
2009); Khanna, ‘Judicial Reform in India’.
India’s criminal justice system tends to have low conviction rates but fairly relaxed
arrest practices (i.e. it is fairly easy to arrest individuals even though convicting them
is diﬃcult – see Vikramaditya Khanna and Kartikey Mahajan, ‘Anticipatory Bail in
India: A Novel Way to Address Misuse of the Criminal Process’, in Jacqueline Ross
and Steven Thaman (eds.), Research Handbook on Comparative Criminal Procedure
(Edward Elgar, 2016). This raises concerns for a number of reasons including
creating a breeding ground for corruption; Khanna, ‘Judicial Reform in India’;
Khanna and Mahajan, ‘Anticipatory Bail in India’.
Khanna and Varottil, ‘The Rarity of Derivative Actions in India’.
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system is based on common law, not statute, and is subject to the
limitations that come with that.28 In particular, the rule in Foss
v. Harbottle applies in full force in India.29 The holding of this case
(i.e. that a derivative action belongs to the company) means that if
shareholders ratify the complained of activity then the suit becomes
infructuous, as the company has eﬀectively said it approves of the
underlying activity. This presents an almost insurmountable hurdle
for minority shareholders trying to sue controllers, because the controlling shareholder can usually manage to get a majority of the shareholders to ratify the complained about action (e.g. by voting the
controller’s shares).30 Although there are exceptions to Foss, they are
rather limited (e.g. suits based on violations of the charter or underlying legislation, such as ultra vires acts, illegal acts, and acts obtained
without a required special resolution) or require the minority shareholder to meet diﬃcult burdens (e.g. showing that the controller
obtained some beneﬁt at the expense of the company (not the minority
per se)).31
In addition, minority shareholders would face challenges in identifying the underlying ﬁduciary duties that were violated. Controlling shareholders do not owe ﬁduciary duties to minorities in India, making
a derivative suit on this basis a non-starter.32 Further, although directors
do owe duties to the company in India, these duties are determined by
reference to the very thin case law present in India.33 Moreover, courts
can protect directors from liability under Section 633 of the Indian
Companies Act 1956 if it is shown that the directors acted honestly and
reasonably.34 This, when combined with the weaker explication of duties
and likely controller ratiﬁcation, leaves the derivative suit mechanism in
India with little power.

28

29

30
31

32
33
34

Ibid. In an earlier study, a co-author and I could only ﬁnd ten derivative suit cases that
reached the High Courts or Supreme Court in India over the last sixty or so years, with
only three being permitted to continue.
(1843) 2 Har 461. Indian cases relying on Foss include Nagappa Chettiar v. The Madras
Race Club (1949) 1 MLJ 662 (Mad) and Nirad Amilal Mehta v. Genelec Ltd (2008) 146
Comp. Cas. 481 (Bom).
See MacDougal v. Gardiner (1875) 1 Ch. D 13.
See Nagappa, above note 29; Arad Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate
Governance, (Oxford University Press. 2007).
See Rolta India Ltd. v. Venire Industries Ltd. (2000) 100 Comp. Cas. 19 (Bom).
For a more detailed discussion see above note 27.
See above note 27. This is quite frequently used.
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2.2.2 Order I, Rule 8, CPC 1908
Another route through which a shareholder may try to initiate private
enforcement is through a ‘representative’ suit under Order I, Rule 8, of
the Civil Procedure Code 1908, which states:
One person may sue or defend on behalf of all in same interest.
(1) Where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit,
(a) one or more of such persons may, with the permission of the
Court, sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or
for the beneﬁt of, all persons so interested.

Generally, a representative suit under this order is thought to be similar
to a motion for claim joinder – where similar suits are brought together
in one proceeding to avoid duplicative litigation.35 This is diﬀerent than
the standard background for a derivative suit – where the concern is that
most shareholders would not bring a suit unless some form of claim
aggregation was permissible. Indeed, the optics are a little stranger still
because a derivative suit is permitted when the board is unwilling to
initiate a suit (perhaps they are conﬂicted) and thus shareholders are
permitted to bring suit, whereas in a representative suit the issue is that all
litigants are keen to bring suit and for judicial economy these claims will
be joined in one proceedings.
In spite of these diﬀerences, some courts seem to have allowed what
looks like a derivative suit to be conducted as a representative suit with
some unusual modiﬁcations. Generally, a representative suit requires the
permission of the court and notice to be provided to all parties (at plaintiﬀ’s
expense). The company is included as a defendant (pro forma) and in case
the plaintiﬀs win then the recovery goes to the company (which is again the
defendant).36 Although this results in an awkward ﬁt, it is somewhat
understandable given the challenges in bringing a successful derivative
suit in the Indian context. Nonetheless, only recently have courts in India
begun to discuss the diﬀerences between derivative suits and representative
actions.37 In any case, the number of representative suits in the corporate
context in India is still vanishingly thin.

2.2.3 Oppression and Mismanagement: Company Law Board
The Company Law Board (and its soon to be successor – the National
Company Law Tribunal (NCLT)) is another player in the enforcement
35
36
37

Prasad, Mulla, The Code of Civil Procedure.
See Jaideep Halwasiya v. Rasoi Ltd (2009) 150 Comp. Cas. 1 (Cal).
See Nagappa Chettiar, above note 29.
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landscape in India. The Company Law Board’s (CLB’s) governance
mandate, for our purposes, is limited to oppression and mismanagement
claims under Sections 397 to 399 of the Companies Act 1956 (now
replaced by Sections 241 to 244 of the Companies Act 2013).38 Under
the 1956 Act the oppression and mismanagement action was not seen as
being too important because the most common remedy available was an
injunction and because the CLB, under section 633 of the 1956 Act, could
protect directors from liability.39 Finally, although the CLB may move
somewhat faster than the civil courts on commercial matters, it has still
been subject to lengthy delays so that any recovery probably has
a substantially reduced real value to a litigant.40

2.2.4 Contract or Tort?
It is conceivable that a shareholder might initiate a fraud action (under
Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act 1872), a misrepresentation claim
(under Section 62 of the Companies Act 1956), or a Common Law tort
claim for deceit. In all these cases the chances of recovery are slim
(because their core elements are diﬃcult to show in modern transactions)
and because the endemic delays in litigation would make any judgment
worth quite a bit less.
For example, under the tort for deceit the plaintiﬀ must show a
fraudulent misrepresentation related to a material fact and that the
plaintiﬀ received the shares directly from the company.41 Thus, secondary market transactions would largely be outside the purview of this tort.
Similarly, the cause of action under Section 17 of the Indian Contracts
Act 1872 requires that the fraud have been conducted by a party to the
transaction thereby exempting most secondary market transactions
where the alleged fraud is by the issuing ﬁrm.42
2.2.5 Impact of Securities Laws on Private Enforcement
India’s securities laws might provide for potential causes of action, but as
noted earlier, if SEBI is empowered to act on a matter or issue an order
38

39

40
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Khanna and Varottil, The Rarity of Derivative Actions in India.
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then the civil courts are not to entertain jurisdiction for private suits.
Thus, as a practical matter these statutory and regulatory provisions do
not generate any scope for private enforcement unless SEBI is not
empowered to act on a matter – which is fairly rare.
This general overview of public and private enforcement in India leads
one to conclude that India has limited public enforcement and almost no
eﬀective private enforcement of corporate and securities laws. Indeed,
prior surveys of enforcement in India have suggested that it is quite
weak.43 Given these weak protections, one might expect that it would
be diﬃcult for dispersedly held ﬁrms to develop, and investors might
then need to rely on other methods (taking larger stakes, relying on
business and social norms) to secure their investment.44
This then leads to the key question animating this chapter: What steps
can be taken that might enhance enforcement in India? The next two
sections begin an inquiry into that question by examining the theoretical
case for private enforcement and then examining how it might be operationalised in the Indian business and institutional context. Following that
is a discussion of the class action mechanism described in the Companies
Act 2013 and other potential enforcement reforms.

3 Potential Value of Private Civil Enforcement
For purposes of obtaining a more thorough understanding of private
enforcement in India, this chapter assumes that public enforcement is
available and then inquires how might private civil enforcement be
a useful supplement.45 This issue is pursued in two steps – ﬁrst, examining how private civil enforcement is likely to enhance the availability of
information on wrongdoing by incentivising private individuals to come
43
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forward with their information, and second by examining how the
potentiality of recovery for individual investors might aid in deepening
the liquidity of stock markets.

3.1 Obtaining Enforcement Relevant Information
Individuals might possess information that is relevant to enforcement
eﬀorts (e.g. on wrongdoing) that government agents may not be able to
easily access or assess.46 An example might be when victims of wrongdoing have information about who harmed them and how that government agents would ﬁnd either diﬃcult or costly to obtain.
By providing these individuals with the prospect of monetary recovery
(or the prospect of having the wrongdoer’s behaviour adjudged negatively) we provide them with an incentive to bring their information to
the attention of authorities thereby increasing the likelihood that the
wrongdoer will be punished (and hence deterring her). There are of
course other ways in which to incentivise private parties to bring information to light (e.g. bounties, whistleblower duties), but I limit my
discussion to private civil enforcement for now.47
In the context of corporate governance one can easily see the value of
private enforcement. There are likely to be many things related to
ﬁduciary duties about which the putative victim is more likely to have
information than the government. Similarly, a shareholder is likely to
have a better understanding of the contractual and other relationships
between the parties as compared to the government.

3.2 Liquidity Enhancing Features?
Another likely beneﬁt of private enforcement is that by providing an
avenue in which investors can obtain monetary remedies for governance
wrongdoing, it reduces the downside risk faced by investors when
46
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investing and should attract more investors to the market (compared to if
such recovery was unlikely or not timely and no insurance was available),
thereby enhancing its liquidity.48 Of course, the risk of governance
wrongdoing or fraud is a risk that investors might also reduce via
diversiﬁcation and thus not require recovery to attract them to the
market. Although certainly plausible for some risks, one must keep in
mind that systemic risk associated with fraud (that aﬀecting the market)
cannot be easily diversiﬁed away. If a market is thought to have rampant
fraud, then people are likely to simply stay away and that would hurt
market development and capital formation.49 Moreover, if diversiﬁcation
is diﬃcult or costly then that too might hurt market development.50 This
leaves space for private enforcement to play a role in enhancing liquidity
by reducing some of the downside risk investors might face.
In the context of India and other emerging markets, if a goal is to
encourage the entry of individual investors at the retail level or even to
attract them to invest via intermediaries (e.g. mutual funds) then the
possibility of recovery for governance wrongdoing might well be an
attractive option. India is estimated to have around two million retail
investors,51 but one must keep in mind that the population is over
1.2 billion. Moreover, foreign investors are quite likely to pay close
attention to governance issues (as has been observed in the past), and
attracting them may involve some measure of private enforcement.52
Of course, assessing the value of private enforcement in India will
require some understanding of how it might ﬁt within the business and
institutional structures in India. It is to those issues that I now turn.
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4 Indian Business and Institutional Context
India’s business and institutional structures share some similarities with
those in the US and Western Europe, but there are also important
diﬀerences that will likely inﬂuence the desirable structure of enforcement for corporate and securities laws. In this section, I focus on two of
the most prominent diﬀerences – ownership structure and institutional
architecture (i.e. judicial and legal system).

4.1 Ownership Structure: Controlled Firms
India has, depending on how one counts, somewhere around 4,000 publicly traded ﬁrms on two major stock exchanges, Bombay Stock Exchange
(BSE) and the National Stock Exchange (NSE). However, virtually all these
ﬁrms are controlled ﬁrms. Some are controlled by family business houses
(e.g. Birla, Ambani, Adani), some by the State (e.g. Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation), some by foreign multinationals (e.g. Nestle India), and
others by Indian founders who are neither family nor part of a kinship
network (e.g. Infosys). There are few truly dispersedly held ﬁrms in India.53
This means that the predominant form of governance concerns in
India are not the typical concerns between shareholders and management (seen in countries with more dispersedly held ﬁrms), but rather the
conﬂict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.54
This conﬂict raises standard concerns about expropriation of the minority rather than pure executive compensation, about freeze outs rather
than hostile takeovers and so forth. In light of this overarching governance concern, what value might private enforcement provide?
First, it seems likely that minority shareholders in a controlled ﬁrm
(especially larger minority shareholders) are likely to have enforcement
relevant information. This is for a number of reasons. First, like shareholders in a dispersedly held ﬁrm, minorities are the likely victims of
governance wrongdoing and are likely to have useful information about
it. Second, some ﬁrms may have minority shareholders who are not
entirely dispersed – that is, some minorities may have sizeable stakes in
53
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George S. Geis, ‘Can Independent Blockholding Really Play Much of a Role in Indian
Corporate Governance?’ 3 Corporate Governance Law Review 283 (2007); Tarun Khanna
and Yishay Yafeh, ‘Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?’, 45
Journal of Economic Literature 331–372 (2007).
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani, ‘The Elusive Quest for Global Governance
Standards’, 157 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1263–1317 (2009). Khanna,
‘Corporate Governance Ratings’; Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law.

4 i n d i a n bu s i n e s s an d i n s t i t u t i o n a l co n t e x t

349

the ﬁrms. These larger positions provide them with the incentive to get
informed about the ﬁrm – something seen less often in dispersedly held
ﬁrms – which in turn suggests they should often have enforcement
relevant information (because they are monitoring). Moreover, minorities may ﬁnd it easier to know who to monitor in a controlled ﬁrm (i.e.
the controller) rather than in a dispersedly held ﬁrm (e.g. management,
the board, large institutional shareholders, and so forth). This may be
even more likely if the minority has other connections with the controller
(e.g. belonging to similar business communities (or caste), having intermingled business interests).
Second, even though minority shareholders may have enforcement
relevant information, it is likely that their access to and use of it may vary
across the diﬀerent types of controlling structures – whether by controller type (e.g. family business, state-owned) or by how control is maintained (e.g. pyramids, cross-holdings).55 For reasons of expositional
brevity, I do not discuss these variations here, but note it is an interesting
area for future research.
Finally, one expects that the potential liquidity enhancing features of
private enforcement are likely to be useful in controlled ﬁrms in India too.
This is especially likely if the government is trying to increase market
liquidity (which India’s government seems keen to do) by attracting
dispersed investors and foreign investors who may not have the other
methods of policing governance that larger minorities may possess (e.g.
interlinked business, similar business and social networks, and so forth).56
In spite of all these beneﬁts of private enforcement, one should be
cognizant of the limitations on private enforcement in the Indian business context. The importance of business families, founders, and powerful bureaucrats running most major ﬁrms in India may create an
atmosphere of reticence in challenging these controllers in open court
and may lead to a preference for less visible challenges or for resolutions
that keep disputes out of the public view.57

4.2 Institutional Architecture
Another key issue in assessing the likely value of private enforcement is
appreciating the institutional architecture within which it might be
55
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utilised. This requires us to gain a deeper understanding of the current
reality of India’s judicial and legal system.
One of the well-known concerns associated with India’s legal system is
the lengthy delays faced by litigants. Indeed, many judgments occur so
long after the alleged wrong that they hardly provide any real recovery.58
Although there are specialist courts for addressing corporate law matters
in India (ﬁrst the CLB and then the soon to be formed NCLT), they have
thus far also suﬀered from lengthy delays. Moreover, plaintiﬀs bringing
private cases in India must bear court fees (i.e. fees for bringing a civil suit
seeking recovery), and these fees can be substantial and may reduce the
attractiveness of suit.59 This makes reliance on private enforcement in the
standard court system less attractive as a means to either obtain enforcement relevant information, enhance liquidity, or police governance
wrongdoing.
However, even if delays were not endemic, there are other concerns.
In particular, it is key to understand who the likely litigants are and what
their incentives might be. In the Indian context (as noted earlier), these
are primarily minority shareholders in controlled ﬁrms. If the minority
is composed of shareholders with sizeable stakes in the ﬁrm (e.g.
5 per cent), then the minority may consider it worthwhile to bear the
costs of bringing suit (including getting informed) and that may make
private enforcement more plausible, holding all else equal. However,
these larger minorities may also have other extra-legal methods of inﬂuencing the controlling shareholder in India making private suits less
likely or less likely to lead to a judgment (as opposed to settlement).60
On the other hand, if the minority is composed of small dispersed
shareholders, then they are unlikely to consider it worthwhile to bear the
costs of bringing an individual suit. Simply put, if most minority shareholders own $100 worth of shares, then none of them are likely to hire
attorneys (who charge more than $100 for such suits) to initiate litigation. This situation is one in which a typical class action with a
58
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contingency fee structure might prove useful. However, in India contingency fees are not permitted.61
Finally, even if minority shareholders were willing to sue and the courts
provided more timely decisions, private enforcement still faces another
hurdle in India – lack of clarity on what the underlying wrong is. Given
that most ﬁrms in India are controlled, the minority would need some
action against the controller (or an action the controller cannot dismiss
easily). India does not, at present, provide for ﬁduciary duties owed by the
controller to the minority. Absent the development of such ﬁduciary
duties, any suits against controllers would need to overcome this issue.
In light of the business structures and institutional conditions in India,
it seems that private enforcement in the corporate governance space is
likely to be quite quixotic. However, that does not mean that reforms
might not improve upon the situation.

5 Reform Alternatives?
Many reform eﬀorts have been pursued in India, but with little substantial eﬀect. In this part, I explore the most recent reform eﬀort – promulgating a class action mechanism for corporate law issues – along with
other reform eﬀorts that might be pursued. First I explore the attempts to
create a class action in India, and then I discuss alternatives to the class
action that may generate greater net beneﬁts in India.

5.1 Class Actions Under the Companies Act 2013
Against this background of fairly limited enforcement, the Companies
Act 2013 introduced the class action via Section 245, which is reproduced
below:

Section 245. Class Action
(1) Such number of member or members, depositor or depositors or
any class of them, as the case may be, as are indicated in sub-section
(2) may, if they are of the opinion that the management or conduct
of the aﬀairs of the company are being conducted in a manner
prejudicial to the interests of the company or its members or
depositors, ﬁle an application before the Tribunal on behalf of the
members or depositors for seeking all or any of the following orders,
namely: –
61
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(a) to restrain the company from committing an act which is ultra
vires the articles or memorandum of the company;
(b) to restrain the company from committing breach of any provision of the company’s memorandum or articles;
(c) to declare a resolution altering the memorandum or articles of
the company as void if the resolution was passed by suppression of material facts or obtained by mis-statement to the
members or depositors;
(d) to restrain the company and its directors from acting on such
resolution;
(e) to restrain the company from doing an act which is contrary to
the provisions of this Act or any other law for the time being in
force;
(f) to restrain the company from taking action contrary to any
resolution passed by the members;
(g) to claim damages or compensation or demand any other suitable action from or against—
(i) the company or its directors for any fraudulent, unlawful
or wrongful act or omission or conduct or any likely act or
omission or conduct on its or their part;
(ii) the auditor including audit ﬁrm of the company for any
improper or misleading statement of particulars made in
his audit report or for any fraudulent, unlawful or wrongful act or conduct; or
(iii) any expert or advisor or consultant or any other person
for any incorrect or misleading statement made to the
company or for any fraudulent, unlawful or wrongful act
or conduct or any likely act or conduct on his part;
(h) to seek any other remedy as the Tribunal may deem ﬁt.
(2) Where the members or depositors seek any damages or compensation or demand any other suitable action from or against an audit
ﬁrm, the liability shall be of the ﬁrm as well as of each partner who
was involved in making any improper or misleading statement of
particulars in the audit report or who acted in a fraudulent, unlawful
or wrongful manner.
(3) (i) The requisite number of members provided in sub-section (1)
shall be as under: –
(a) in the case of a company having a share capital, not less than
one hundred members of the company or not less than such
percentage of the total number of its members as may be
prescribed, whichever is less, or any member or members
holding not less than such percentage of the issued share
capital of the company as may be prescribed, subject to the
condition that the applicant or applicants has or have paid
all calls and other sums due on his or their shares;
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(b) in the case of a company not having a share capital, not less
than one-ﬁfth of the total number of its members.
(ii) The requisite number of depositors provided in sub-section (1)
shall not be less than one hundred depositors or not less than
such percentage of the total number of depositors as may be
prescribed, whichever is less, or any depositor or depositors to
whom the company owes such percentage of total deposits of
the company as may be prescribed.
(4) In considering an application under sub-section (1), the Tribunal
shall take into account, in particular—
(a) whether the member or depositor is acting in good faith in
making the application for seeking an order;
(b) any evidence before it as to the involvement of any person other
than directors or oﬃcers of the company on any of the matters
provided in clauses (a) to (f) of sub-section (1);
(c) whether the cause of action is one which the member or
depositor could pursue in his own right rather than through
an order under this section;
(d) any evidence before it as to the views of the members or depositors of the company who have no personal interest, direct or
indirect, in the matter being proceeded under this section;
(e) where the cause of action is an act or omission that is yet to
occur, whether the act or omission could be, and in the circumstances would be likely to be—
(i) authorised by the company before it occurs; or
(ii) ratiﬁed by the company after it occurs;
(f) where the cause of action is an act or omission that has already
occurred, whether the act or omission could be, and in the
circumstances would be likely to be, ratiﬁed by the company.
(5) If an application ﬁled under sub-section (1) is admitted, then the
Tribunal shall have regard to the following, namely: –
(a) public notice shall be served on admission of the application to
all the members or depositors of the class in such manner as
may be prescribed;
(b) all similar applications prevalent in any jurisdiction should be
consolidated into a single application and the class members or
depositors should be allowed to choose the lead applicant and
in the event the members or depositors of the class are unable to
come to a consensus, the Tribunal shall have the power to
appoint a lead applicant, who shall be in charge of the proceedings from the applicant’s side;
(c) two class action applications for the same cause of action shall
not be allowed;
(d) the cost or expenses connected with the application for class
action shall be defrayed by the company or any other person
responsible for any oppressive act.
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(6) Any order passed by the Tribunal shall be binding on the company
and all its members, depositors and auditor including audit ﬁrm or
expert or consultant or advisor or any other person associated with
the company.
(7) Any company which fails to comply with an order passed by the
Tribunal under this section shall be punishable with ﬁne which shall
not be less than ﬁve lakh rupees but which may extend to twenty-ﬁve
lakh rupees and every oﬃcer of the company who is in default shall
be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
three years and with ﬁne which shall not be less than twenty-ﬁve
thousand rupees but which may extend to one lakh rupees.
(8) Where any application ﬁled before the Tribunal is found to be
frivolous or vexatious, it shall, for reasons to be recorded in writing,
reject the application and make an order that the applicant shall pay
to the opposite party such cost, not exceeding one lakh rupees, as
may be speciﬁed in the order.
(9) Nothing contained in this section shall apply to a banking company.
(10) Subject to the compliance of this section, an application may be ﬁled
or any other action may be taken under this section by any person,
group of persons or any association of persons representing the
persons aﬀected by any act or omission, speciﬁed in sub-section (1).

Section 245 is largely concerned with restraining the behaviour of the ﬁrm
and its members rather than compensating shareholders (Sections 245(1)(a)
to (f)). The only provisions allowing for monetary remedies are Section
245(1)(g) and (h). However, even here the remedies might be viewed as
limited, given that none of the provisions explicitly mention the controller.
For example, Section 245(1)(g) allows for monetary remedies primarily
against the ﬁrm, its directors or advisors for fraudulent, illegal or wrongful
behaviour. It is conceivable that controllers might be included in the ‘any
other person’ language in Section 245(1)(g)(iii), but given the general tenor
of the Section and the context of this language it does not appear that
controllers are the targets. Moreover, because controllers do not owe ﬁduciary duties to minority shareholders in India, it is not clear whether their
behaviour would trigger a class action under Section 245. Indeed, the focus
on whether the company has ratiﬁed the complained of activity (Sections
245(4)(e) and (f)) and the provision requiring the company to pay for
plaintiﬀ’s legal expenses (Section 245(5)(d)) appear poorly suited for
a typical suit brought by a minority shareholder against a controller and
instead seem more suited to a typical derivative action.
However, we are left to speculate on how far Section 245 might go
because, as of this writing, no cases have been initiated under Section 245.
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This is largely due to the fact that the NCLT has not yet been formally set
up. Consequently, it is unclear how the class action mechanism will be
operationalised, but given the absence of ﬁduciary duties owed by the
controller and the language in Section 245, it seems unlikely that it would
be a very eﬀective tool for generating monetary recoveries to minority
shareholders. Indeed, there is no provision permitting contingency
fees, which makes Section 245 less appealing for smaller minority
shareholders.
Even if the current version of a class action does not provide much
solace to shareholders, one could consider alternative reforms. Many
might be discussed (e.g. bounties, stock exchange enforcement),62 but
this chapter discusses two reforms that may pay bigger dividends than the
current class action regime.

5.2 Regulatory Early Warning System
Prior research has suggested that ex ante measures may be particularly
valuable in contexts where large harm may be generated from wrongdoing (e.g. the Satyam Fraud).63 One such measure might be a regulatory
early warning system where regulators (such as SEBI) put out information on factors that might be correlated with greater wrongdoing risk so
that investors are aware of this and can adjust their behaviour (or initiate
litigation and so forth). This may be particularly valuable where wrongdoing is diﬃcult to detect (even with private enforcement) because when
regulators provide information on factors correlated with wrongdoing,
that may trigger responses by investors and others that might reduce the
potential harm or prevent further wrongdoing, if any.
Of course, for such an early warning system to be eﬀective, one must be
able to identify some factors correlated with wrongdoing and the current
surveillance systems should be able to detect these signs. Although such
a list is diﬃcult to provide with ﬁnality, below are a list of factors that
62
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Table 16.1 Proposed list of possible early warning signals
Early Warning Signals
If some directors (especially independent directors) resign unexpectedly.
If there are recent oﬀ-balance-sheet transactions.
If there was a decision to withdraw an oﬀering of stock or debt.
Any restatement of ﬁnancial or other important results.
Related-party transactions that exceed some threshold (e.g. 5 per cent of net proﬁt).
If the controller has been selling down her stake in the ﬁrm in an unanticipated
manner.

would seem useful to someone concerned about potential wrongdoing at
a ﬁrm (some of these factors arise from studies discussed in previous
writings by Khanna).64
For an early warning signal system to be eﬀective, we must believe that
investors will rely on that system in deciding where to invest or whether
to sue. There is little evidence in India about whether either is likely, but
in other countries where disclosure based systems have been tried (e.g.
‘comply-or-explain’ rules in parts of Europe), they have met with some
measured success.65 It is conceivable that if there is suﬃcient analyst
coverage, something similar may occur in India.

5.3 Arbitration
Another potential reform is that ﬁrms that are publicly traded be allowed
(or perhaps required) to have shareholders pursue corporate governance
claims in arbitral proceedings rather than in judicial or tribunal proceedings. This has advantages in terms of obtaining expertise in decision
making as well as procedural eﬃciency and speed.66 Such an approach
64
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has been tried in some other jurisdictions. For example, arbitration provisions are available in Brazil for ﬁrms listed on the Novo Mercado,67 and in
China for ﬁrms domiciled in China issuing stock overseas.68 Moreover, in
India too there are ﬁrms that oﬀer arbitration as a method of resolving
disputes with shareholders.69 Under a functioning arbitration system, one
expects that the enforcement relevant information and liquidity enhancing
eﬀects of private enforcement would both be present because of the
prospect of monetary recovery for those providing relevant information
(who are most likely to be shareholders). Although conclusive results of
these experiments in China and Brazil are not yet available, there is little
evidence that arbitration has made the situation any worse than the status
quo ante.

6 Conclusion
Enforcement of corporate and securities laws is generally acknowledged
to be important to the growth of capital markets, and this may be
especially so in emerging markets. In the Indian context, the preexisting state of both public and private enforcement of corporate and
securities laws was fairly weak, and thus attempts to revamp the area via
the class action device in Section 245 of the Companies Act 2013 were
greeted with some enthusiasm. Indeed, there are good theoretical reasons
to think that private enforcement could be beneﬁcial in India, although
there may be some limitations in light of India’s institutional and business climate.
However, the version of class actions drawn by Section 245 seems
constrained in its likely eﬀectiveness. Monetary remedies do not seem to
be the primary aim of the provision, and it is not accompanied by other
changes that would make it more likely to work in the Indian context.
In particular, the prohibition on contingency fees and the absence of
67
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ﬁduciary duties owed by controllers to minorities would appear to hamstring the eﬀectiveness of the class action provision in India. Thus, it
appears that the opportunity to enhance investor protection in India is
unlikely to be much furthered by Section 245.
Nonetheless, there may be some measures that can be taken that would
be beneﬁcial in the Indian context, such as regulatory early warning
signals and the increased use of arbitration to resolve shareholder disputes. Early warning signals may help to trigger shareholder monitoring
and avert large-scale harms and arbitration helps to address a perennial
problem in the Indian legal system – the lengthy delays in the courts and
tribunals. Some mix of these measures appear more likely to beneﬁt
investors interested in the Indian markets than the current version of
class actions exempliﬁed by Section 245.

